INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 1 which allows courts and agencies to award costs and fees, including attorney's fees, to parties who prevail in litigation against the federal government. 2 In the absence of another statute specifically providing for a fee award, the BAJA mandates such an award unless the court finds that the government's position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make such an award unjust.3 Prior to the enactment of the BAJA, the federal government was immune from statutory and common law fee-shifting provisions § 2412 Costs and Fees · (a)(l) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in § 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action ...• (b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award ....
(d)(l)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. . under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 4 The EAJA thereby puts the government on equal footing with nongovernment litigants potentially subject to fee-shifting. The EAJA grants fee-shifting authority to "any court having jurisdiction of such action." 5 Courts and commentators currently dispute whether the EAJA grants the federal bankruptcy courts authority to shift fees against the federal government. 6 A split between the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits frames the controversy. The Tenth Circuit has held that Congress granted EAJA authority to the bankruptcy courts,7 whereas the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that bankruptcy courts are not "any court" within the meaning of the BAJA and thus cannot shift fees. s
The applicability of the BAJA to the bankruptcy courts is important because the federal government is either a lender or guarantor of more than $870 billion in loans. 9 In addition, the government assumes the role of creditor in many of its contractual relations by making progress or advance payments to contractors 4. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975) . The statutory and common law exceptions to the "American rule" -that each party must bear its own legal expenses -are numerous. The American rule dictates that a prevailing litigant is not entitled to collect reasonable attorney's fees from the loser. 421 U.S. at 247. Although the Supreme Court in Alyeska rejected the "private attorney general" exception to the American rule in cases involving the federal government, 421 U.S. at 265-68, the Court recognized the "common fund" and bad faith exceptions to the rule. 421 U.S. at 257-59. 5. 28 U.S.C. § 2412{a), (b) (1988) (emphasis added). 6. The law clearly permits bankruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against private litigants. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) {1988) (providing for award of fees for willful violation of a stay of actions against property); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7054 (providing for award of costs); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (providing for sanctions including fees and costs); see also infra note 171. cifically the Internal Revenue Service, is a frequent violator of the automatic stay 15 and permanent injunction 16 provisions of the bankruptcy code.17 The prevalence of federal lending and the increase in bankruptcy filings highlight the importance of a resolution to the question of the EAJA's applicability to the bankruptcy courts. 18 This Note argues that the bankruptcy courts have authority under the BAJA to shift fees against the federal government. Part I discusses the relevant caselaw and examines the basis of the current controversy. Part II examines the statutory language, the legislative history, and the stated purposes of the BAJA and concludes that each of these aspects of the statute demonstrates a congressional intent to grant fee-shifting authority to the bankruptcy courts. Part III considers alternatives to finding bankruptcy court jurisdiction over BAJA disputes, rejecting each as inefficient and unnecessary. This Note concludes that courts should construe the BAJA consistinjunctive powers of the bankruptcy court and implicating federal government for violation of automatic stay).
15. After a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay prohibits creditors from continuing or commencing any action to enforce judgments, collect debts, or perfect liens against the property of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362{a) {1988). Some legal actions against the debtor are not prohibited, 11 U.S.C. § 362{b) {1988), and creditors may move to have the stay lifted for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362{d) (1988) .
16. The discharge of a debtor in bankruptcy acts·as an injunction against commencement or continuation of collection actions with regard to discharged debts against the debtor or the debtor's property. See 11 U.S.C. § 524{a) {1988).
17. Due to an uncooperative computer, the IRS has not adequately controlled enforcement actions against tax debtors, a shortcoming that has resulted in numerous "opportunities" for the IRS to appear before the bankruptcy· courts to try to explain its repeated violations of the bankruptcy code. One court observed:
In its more than two decade-long involvement as a practitioner, professor and judge in the bankruptcy system, this court has never encountered a more egregious flaunting of the bankruptcy system as that which it has seen by the IRS in this case .... This conduct has only been engaged in by those in charge of the IRS's computers. 18. Despite the small decrease in bankruptcy filings, adversary proceedings are being brought faster than the bankruptcy courts can adjudicate them. As of March 31, 1993, 138,907 adversary proceedings were pending in the bankruptcy courts, a 24.1 % increase from the prior year. WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12, app. tbl. F-8, at 85. In the 12 months prior to March 31, 1993, 100,412 adversary proceedings were filed and 73,449 were disposed of meaning there is over a one-year backlog in the bankruptcy courts for adversary proceedings. Id. See also supra note 12.
[Vol. 92:2248 ently with its language, history, and purpose, and allow the bankruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against the federal government in appropriate cases.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY
Although three circuit courts have decided cases presenting the issue of whether the bankruptcy courts may shift fees under the authority of the EAJA, only two have explicitly addressed the issue of jurisdiction. 19 Cir. 1985) , the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy court in order to give the parties an opportunity to present their evidence on the issue of the government's alleged substantial justification for its position. 752 F.2d at 1109. The appellate court apparently presumed that bankruptcy courts have authority to shift fees under the EAJA because it remanded the case for an evaluation of a defense to the claim for fees. 752 F.2d at 1109. This decision lends some credence to the argument that the plain meaning of the statute is clear. BAJA because bankruptcy courts fall within the plain meaning of "any court" 24 and because the inclusion of bankruptcy courts furthers BAJA policies. 25 The O'Connor court relied on its interpretation of the "plain meaning" of the EAJA, invoking the general principle that "[a] court should venture into the thicket of legislative history only when necessary to determine 'a statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity.' " 26 The O'Connor court held that the plain meaning of "any court" includes the bankruptcy courts.27
The O'Connor court also noted that Congress could have modified the term "any court" if it had intended to limit the jurisdictional reach of the BAJA to a specific subset of courts. 28 The court reasoned that the unmodified use of court supported its view that the plain meaning of "any court" included the bankruptcy courts. 29 In further support of its textual analysis, the O'Connor court also stated that its conclusion comports with the general purpose of the EAJA, namely to encourage citizens to challenge unreasonable government action despite the high cost of litigation.3o 1990) . Davis, the debtor, borrowed $985,000 from the Farmers Home Administration {FmHA) and subsequently filed bankruptcy. 899 F.2d at 1137. Gower, the trustee, tried to recover payments made to the FmHA as preferential transfers under § 547{b) of the bankruptcy code. 899 F.2d at 1137 (construing 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), (c) {1988)). The bankruptcy court found the FmHA's conduct misleading toward other creditors, ordered the return of the payments, and equitably subordinated FmHA's claims. 899 F.2d at 1137. The trustee was therefore a prevailing party and the bankruptcy court awarded EAJA fees. The FmHA appealed. 899 F.2d at 1138.
32. 899 F.2d at 1138-42. The court also held that a bankruptcy trustee is not a "party," 899 F.2d at 1142-45, defined in the EAJA as:
i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, or ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2412{d){2){B) (1988) . Because the Eleventh Circuit held that the trustee is not a party, it found the trustee ineligible to receive an award. 899 F.2d at 1145. Although the dispute surrounding the proper definition of "party" within the EAJA is beyond the scope of [Vol. 92:2248 sources to support its denial of jurisdiction: the precedent of Bowen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 33 and the legislative history of the EAJA.34
In Bowen, the Eleventh Circuit h.eld that the tax courts did not have jurisdiction to award BAJA fees to a prevailing party, relying on cross-references within title 28 and the unique position of the tax courts under title 26. 35 The Bowen court first noted that the BAJA allowed recovery of the "costs" enumerated in section 1920 of title 28. 36 Section 1920 is entitled "Taxation of Costs" and partially codifies the equitable power of the federal courts. 37 The Bowen court then noted that section 1920 states that costs may be shifted by a "court of the United States," 3 8 a term that is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451. 39 The court reasoned that the EAJA's reference to the costs enumerated in section 1920 also incorporated section 1920's jurisdictional limitation to "courts of the United States" as defined by section 451. 40 Therefore, the Bowen court held that BAJA fees this Note, this footnote addresses the issue briefly because the jurisdictional authority of the bankruptcy courts to shift EAJA fees is of practical importance only if bankruptcy trustees are "parties" eligible to receive EAJA awards. The Davis court held that a trustee in bank· ruptcy is not an eligible party to receive an EAJA award because the trustee did not fit comfortably into the court's conception of "organization." 899 F.2d at 1144. The Eleventh Circuit, however, subsequently limited that part of the Davis holding to Chapter 7 trustees. In re Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696, 702-03 (11th Cir. 1991) . Because, at a minimum, Chapter 11 debtors in possession are eligible parties to receive awards, it is important to establish the authority of the bankruptcy court to make EAJA awards.
The Davis court also argued that the difficulty in applying the EAJA's net-worth and number-of-employees tests, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988) , to bankruptcy trustees militates towards finding trustees outside the definition of "party" under the EAJA. 899 F.2d at 1144 n.18. For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that the net-worth and number-of-employees tests apply only to parties seeking mandatory awards under § 2412(d) and not to those seeking discretionary awards under § 2412(b ) . This statement, although describing subsection {b) of § 2412, informs the analysis of subsection {d) because of the similarity in the phrasing of the jurisdiction granting language in each subsection. Subsection (b) grants fee shifting authority to "any court having jurisdiction of such action," 28 U.S.C. § 2412{b) {1988), which is nearly identical to the grant of subsection {d), which provides authority to "any court having jurisdiction of that action," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d){l)(A) (1988 Cir. 1986 ) ("Absent some compelling reason to read the analogous phrases in the two statutes differently, they should be interpreted consistently."). The main distinction in the respective grants of jurisdiction is that the EAJA grants jurisdiction to "any court," see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988), while § 7430 allows only a "court of the United States" to shift fees. See 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(6) (1988).
One would therefore expect courts to be less likely to allow bankruptcy courts to award § 7430 fees than EAJA fees because bankruptcy courts are not "courts of the United States" as that term is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988 
A. The Textual Meaning of the EAJA
Any statutory construction must begin with the language of the statute. 49 The language of the BAJA provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.50 Section II.A.1 discusses the language of the BAJA, concluding that "any court" plainly includes the bankruptcy courts. Section II.A.2 considers the argument based on a cross-reference to the definition of a "court of the United States" and concludes that the language of BAJA does not limit the statute's scope to those courts.
The Plain Language of the EAJA
According to the plain language of the EAJA, the bankruptcy courts should have the ability to shift fees against the federal government. The text of the BAJA grants jurisdiction over BAJA petitions to "any court." According to its plain and ordinary meaning, the term court means" '[a] person or group of persons whose task is to hear and submit a decision on cases at law.' " 51 By this definition, bankruptcy courts are courts and therefore should be covered by the BAJA's grant of authority to "any court."52
In addition, the phrase "any court" is unmodified in the BAJA, even though Congress could have used the more restrictive "court of the United States" if Congress had intended "any court" to mean some subset of all federal courts. 53 Congress's failure to modify "any court" further indicates a broad textual grant of authority to any court properly adjudicating a civil action.
Cross-References to the Definition of "Courts of the United
States" An alternative textual analysis potentially conflicts with the result obtained by simply following the plain meaning of court. The Eleventh Circuit has relied on cross-references within title 28 to hold that the EAJA grants fee-shifting authority only to those courts listed in section 451 of title 28. 54 This statutory construction was introduced in Bowen v. Commissioner, 55 and followed in Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Davis). 5 6 The Bowen court transformed the EAJA's incorporation of the costs enumerated in se.ction 1920 into an adoption of the jurisdictional requirement of section 1920.57 ·The EAJA's reference to section 1920, however, does not support the inference that the EAJA incorporates section 1920's jurisdictional limitation. First, the EAJA states only that "a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 ... may be awarded."58 The EAJA makes no reference to section 1920's jurisdictional limit. 59
Second, this cross-referencing construction leads to an incongruous BAJA. The BAJA grants fee-shifting authority not only to "any court" with subject matter jurisdiction,6° but also to "[a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication." 61 It is unlikely that Congress intended to grant fee-shifting authority to the courts listed in section 451 as well as to all the agencies that conduct adversarial hearings yet intended to withhold that authority from the bankruptcy courts. To the contrary, the grant of authority to administrative agencies belies any congressional intent to limit BAJA jurisdiction to the supposedly more qualified and prestigious "courts of the United States." The inclusion of administrative agencies makes clear Congress's intent to provide comprehensive relief to citizens besieged by unreasonable government action. 62 Third, Congress would presumably have included important jurisdictional limitations to the BAJA in the BAJA itself, rather than squirrel them away in section 1920. Careful examination of the BAJA subsections exposes the tenuous nature of the link between section 1920's jurisdictional limitation and the BAJA. The passage of the BAJA altered the existing law, 63 extending the common law exceptions to the American rule to the federal government by creating subsection (b) of section 2412. 64 In addition, the BAJA provides in section 2412's new subsection (d) that if the nongovernment party prevails, the government must demonstrate that its actions were substantially justified in order to avoid paying that party's litigation costs. 65 On the other hand, in amending subsection (a) of section 2412, the BAJA merely restates the law prior to the EAJA, under which courts could transfer costs other than attorney's fees as an exercise of equitable power. tions would likely include the same reference to section 1920 found in subsection (a). The reference to the costs enumerated in section 1920 was taken from the statute that' the EAJA replaced and was preserved in section 2412(a). The predecessor statute, An Act to Provide for Judgments for Costs Against the United States, 68 stated, "costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title ... may be awarded ... in any court having jurisdiction of such action." 69 The legislative history to the EAJA's predecessor even more clearly demonstrates that Congress intended the reference to section 1920 only to enumerate the costs that could be awarded under the statute, not to attach the restrictive jurisdiction of section 1920. The Senate Report states: "The costs which are referred to in this bill are listed in section 1920 of title 28, United States Code .... " 70 As in the EAJA, no mention is made of section 1920 with respect to jurisdiction.11
This analysis demonstrates that in order to argue that the jurisdictional requirement of section 1920 limits section 2412(b) and 2412(d), one must presume that Congress meant to limit EAJA jurisdiction indirectly -by first attaching the jurisdiction of section 1920 to section 2412(a) and then extending the supposed jurisdictional limit of subsection (a) to subsections (b) and (d). A simpler interpretation of the reference to section 1920 -and one better supported by the textual and historical record -is that it provides a shorthand delineation of the types of costs courts have historically been able to award to preserve equitable treatment of all parties. The argument put forth by the Eleventh Circuit that the bankruptcy courts lack EAJA authority because they are not listed in section 451 is therefore incorrect because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the EAJA, it leads to incongruous results, and it rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory structure.
Although the text of the EAJA plainly appears to grant the bankruptcy courts the authority to shift fees, courts and commentators disagree as to the sufficiency of a purely textual approach. The Supreme Court, for example, recently looked beyond the plain meaning of a statute to its "purposes and origins" in order to determine its meaning. 72 455 (1989) . The Court, faced with a dispute over the meaning of the word "utilized" in the Federal Advisory tice Scalia, argue that textual plain meaning is a sufficient method for statutory analysis. 73 Because courts are sometimes reluctant to rely solely on the plain meaning of a statute, 74 and in order to avoid the skepticism that exclusive reliance on plain meaning sometimes engenders, 75 the next two sections examine the history and purposes of the BAJA.
B. The Legislative History of the EAJA
Congress has amended the BAJA several times since enacting it in 1980. 76 This section investigates the legislative history of both the original passage of the BAJA and the subsequent amendments which affect the BAJA's definition of "any court," and concludes that Congress originally intended to grant EAJA jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts and that subsequent amendments did not undermine that intent. This section reconciles the broad language of the BAJA, granting fee-shifting authority to "any court" having subject matter jurisdiction over the substantive issue before the court, with House Report 1418 which stipulates that " [ 
Enactment of the EAJA
Understanding the historical context of the enactment of the EAJA is crucial to understanding the statute's relationship to the bankruptcy courts. When Congress enacted the BAJA in 1980, 78 the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA) controlled the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. 79 Congress passed the BAJA during a statutory "transition period" between the old bankruptcy system and the system created by the BRA. 80 Different sections of the BRA became effective at varying points throughout the transition period. 81 Congress repealed the BRA before it became fully effective. 82 Section 241 of the BRA gave the bankruptcy courts all the jurisdiction of the district courts with respect to title 11 cases and proceedings.s 3 This "pass-through" jurisdiction was in place when the EAJA was enacted in 1980. 84 It is undisputed that a district (b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts. civil action with the United States." 92 The Conference Report also states that the "bill requires a Federal Court to award to a prevailing party other than the United States in a civil action involving the United States fees ... and other expenses."9 3 Significantly, Congress did not modify "civil action" and used "federal court" rather than "court of the United States." Because bankruptcy courts are federal courts 94 and bankruptcy actions are civil actions,9s the language of these three reports includes the bankruptcy courts among those able to adjudicate BAJA petitions.
The language of these reports conflicts with House Report 1418's apparent limitation of "any court" to those courts enumerated in section 451. 96 One obvious resolution of this conflict is that the single statement in House Report 1418 simply does not represent the true intent of Congress regarding BAJA jurisdiction.97 Yet even if House Report 1418 accurately reflects Congress's intent, and only courts listed in 28 U.S.C. § 451 were granted BAJA jurisdiction, Congress still likely intended to include the bankruptcy courts. The reference to "court of the United States" in House Report 1418 was made at a time when section 451 was scheduled to be amended to include the bankruptcy courts. 98 Prior to the enactment of the BRA, section 451, in pertinent part, provided:
The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court and any court ere- ated by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office during good behavior.99
The BRA amended section 451 to add the " 'bankruptcy courts, the judges of which are entitled to hold office for a term of 14 years.' "100 The amendment to section 451 was scheduled to go into effect on April 1, 1984. 101 Thus, even if House Report 1418 properly describes Congress's intent with respect to the scope of EAJA authority, 102 the bankruptcy courts, in their own right, would automatically assume EAJA authority in less than three years once the BRA had been fully implemented. 103 In the meantime, bankruptcy courts would exercise all the power of the district court by virtue of the pass-through jurisdiction that was applicable during the transition period. 104 Because the bankruptcy courts, in practice, could exercise EAJA authority without an explicit grant of jurisdiction during the transition period, a specific congressional grant of authority was simply unnecessary. 108 The Marathon Court held unconstitutional the bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional authority under BRA section 241. Because the Court also held that the unconstitutional portion of the jurisdictional grant was inseverable from the remainder of section 241, it struck down the entire section. 109 Congress responded with the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 {BAFJA). 110 This section demonstrates that neither the Court's decision in Marathon nor the terms of the BAFJA undermine bankruptcy court authority under the EAJA.
Effect of Subsequent Events on the EAJA
The Supreme Court invalidated the BRA in Marathon on the ground that bankruptcy courts cannot adjudicate questions of private rights. 111 The Marathon plurality noted, however, that matters involving public rights could be adjudicated by federal tribunals that lacked Article III protections. 112 The government creates a public right when it waives its sovereign immunity and consents to be sued,11 3 as it did in passing the EAJA. EAJA applications are complaints against the government in an area where Congress has full authority to waive sovereign immunity. EAJA applications 111. 458 U.S. at 83-84. In Marathon, the debtor, the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. sued the Marathon Pipeline Co. in the bankruptcy court to recover damages for breach of contract and warranty. The Court found no applicable exception to the general rule that the judicial power of the United States must be exercised by an Article III tribunal. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 70-71. The Supreme Court later stated its holding in Marathon as follows:
The Court's holding ... establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to appellate review. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985) .
112. One of the exceptions to the general rule that the judicial power of the United States must be exercised by an Article III tribunal is that Congress may assign questions of public rights to non-Article III bodies. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 67-70; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929).
113. 458 U.S. at 67-69. therefore qualify as public rights which may be adjudicated by nonArticle III bodies, including the bankruptcy courts. 114 In Marathon, the Court also ruled that the unconstitutional aspects of BRA section 241 were not severable from the remainder of the Act. 115 This effectively invalidated the entire BRA. Thus, due to Marathon's invalidation of section 241 in its entirety, including the "pass through" jurisdiction from the district courts to the bankruptcy courts, the bankruptcy courts no longer exercised power identical to the district courts in title 11 cases. 11 6 The Supreme Court left the onus on Congress to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts.11 7 Congress passed the BAFJA to remedy the constitutional deficiencies of the BRA identified by the Court in Marathon.11 8 Under the BAFJA, the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction over title 11 cases but would not be a "court of the United States." 11 9 The BAFJA took effect June 27, 1984.120
Although the Eleventh Circuit held, in effect, that the BAFJA's elimination of "court of the United States" status for the bankruptcy courts removed BAJA jurisdiction from the bankruptcy courts, 121 it is likely that Congress was completely unaware that the BAFJA amendments affected the EAJA. Even if congressional researchers examined every statutory cross-reference to section 451 
The Court stated:
As part of a comprehensive restructuring of the bankruptcy laws, Congress has vested jurisdiction over this and all matters related to cases under Title 11 in a single non-Art. III court, and has done so pursuant to a single statutory grant of jurisdiction. In these circumstances we cannot conclude that if Congress were aware that the grant of jurisdiction could not constitutionally encompass this and similar claims, it would simply remove the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over these matters, leaving the jurisdictional provision and the adjudicatory structure intact with respect to other types of claims, and thus subject to Art. III constitutional challenge on a claim-by-claim basis. of title 28 -which the BRA had amended to include the bankruptcy courts -before amending that section in the BAFJA, they would not have been directed to the EAJA because the EAJA itself contains no cross-reference to section 451. 122 Furthermore, the legislative history of the BAFJA gives no indication that Congress was aware that the enactment of the BAFJA affected other statutes.1 23 Absent clear evidence that Congress intended wide-reaching effects in other statutes when it replaced section 1471 of the BRA, one should not conclude that Congress intended for the BAFJA to take EAJA authority from the bankruptcy courts. 124
It is important to recognize that the issue is not whether the bankruptcy courts are appropriately considered "courts of the United States" as defined in section 451. The real question is whether the bankruptcy courts can exercise BAJA authority. 1 zs The questions are distinct. 127 If Congress's intent in passing the BAJA was to grant authority to the bankruptcy courts only because they were expected to be "courts of the United States" and enjoyed the equivalent of district court jurisdiction under the BRA and were therefore qualified to exercise BAJA power, then it is true that the Marathon decision and the enactment of BAFJA would have stripped the bankruptcy courts of BAJA power. If, however, Congress intended to grant BAJA authority to the bankruptcy courts regardless of their status as "courts of the United States," then the limitation in House Report 1418 is merely descriptive rather than defining, as section 451 was meant to include the bankruptcy courts. In that case, the developments catalyzed by Marathon should not alter the original intent of Congress, which was to give the bankruptcy courts BAJA power. 1 2s
The BAJA itself provides convincing evidence that Congress did not believe that only the "courts of the United States" as defined in section 451 were qualified to enforce the BAJA. Beyond granting fee-shifting power "in any civil action" to "any court having jurisdiction of that action," 129 the statute also grants fee-shifting authority to "[a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication." 130 An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication is not a "court of the United States." 131 Congress's willingness to allow BAJA fee shifting by administrative agencies strongly suggests that fee-shifting authority should not depend upon status as a "court of the United States."
The inclusion of agency adjudicative bodies among those empowered to shift fees also demonstrates that, for BAJA purposes, there is no substantive significance in section 451's list of courts. One need not be appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress for a life term to be judicially qualified to enforce the 133 One commentator, relying on the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius -the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another 134 - suggests that courts should interpret the inclusion of the Claims Court in the 1985 amendment to exclude the bankruptcy courts. 135 Courts should reject this argument for three reasons. First, the language of the 1985 amendment simply does not lend itself to interpretation under expressio unius. The 1985 amendment to the BAJA definition of court provides that the EAJA definition of court includes the Claims Court. 136 According to the Supreme Court, "the term 'including' is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle." 13 7 Therefore, expressio unius ought not apply to an illustrative list signaled by the operative verb includes. The 1985 amendment to include the Claims Court -a non-Article III court -in the EAJA definition of court represented an "illustrative application of the general principle" 138 that BAJA's refer-ence to "any court" plainly includes non-Article III courts. Thus a court need not be listed in section 451 as a "court of the United States'' to exercise EAJA authority properly. 139 Second, the expressio unius doctrine should not apply given the EAJA's legislative background. The doctrine assumes that all alternatives not elected were considered and rejected,1 4 o an assumption that cannot be supported in this case. Although some commentators criticize the use of the doctrine on this ground generally, 141 its use is especially questionable in this instance, because the legislative history indicates that the 1985 143. One commentator has noted that legislatures often respond discretely to particular problems:
A legislature typically acts only when and as someone presses it to act. Hence it is likely to deal at one point of time with less than the whole, potential extent of the issues or choices it confronts. Thus, legislative intent may emerge in full definition only through a succession of acts. HURST, supra note 75, at 61. 141 Although the 1992 amendment appears to provide additional support for the expressio unius argument, the amendment provides no more evidence of a congressional intent to exclude the bankruptcy courts from BAJA authority than does the similar 1985 amendment. In the legislative history of the 1992 amendment, Congress again emphasized that the amendment was a response to a particular court opinion, 14 8 and that the amendment was merely a clarification of existing law. 149
The 1992 BAJA amendment was a response to Jones v. Derwinski, 150 in which the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals held that it lacked authority to award EAJA fees because Congress did not intend for the cpurt to have BAJA authority. 151 As with the bankruptcy courts, however, the plain meaning of "any court" in the BAJA's jurisdictional provision indicates that the statute should have covered the Court of Veterans Appeals. 152 The legislative history of the 1992 amendment underscores this point by emphasizing that the amendment was merely a clarification of existing law, not a change in law. 153 The House Judiciary Committee, by classifying the amendment as a clarification rather than a change in law, suggests that the amendment is an example of the proper interpretation of the meaning of "court" within the EAJA. 154 Thus once again, the expressio unius doctrine should not apply because no evidence of a comprehensive review of the scope of the BAJA exists.
To the contrary, Congress again opted for a narrow solution rather than considering other possible ambiguities in BAJA jurisdiction, 155 even though the circuit split regarding bankruptcy jurisdiction had developed. 15 6 Endowing this process with the presumption of careful consideration and exclusion of all other possible amendments makes little sense in light of the actual record. The better explanation of the 1985 and 1992 amendments is that they are examples of Congress' clarifying the existing law by correcting court decisions that took the wrong path. As such, both the 1985 and 1992 amendments may be categorized as legislative interpretations of the BAJA that serve to emphasize the broad reach of the BAJA.
C. Purposes of the EAJA
Examining the purposes of the EAJA provides further support for the conclusion that the bankruptcy courts have fee-shifting authority -a conclusion already reached through textual analysis and a review of the legislative history. This section examines four purposes of the BAJA -encouraging private litigants to assert their legal rights against the government despite the government's overwhelming resource advantage, providing for equality among litigants, establishing a check on government power, and encouraging a testing ground for government positions 157 -and concludes that 157. According to the EAJA, "position of the United States" means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based; except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings (Vol. 92:2248 granting BAJA authority to bankruptcy courts furthers each of these purposes.
Reducing the Deterrent Effect of Government Resources on the Average Litigant
Bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA is consistent with the EAJA's purpose of providing a check on the coercive potential of the government's tremendous resources. In enacting the EAJA, Congress voiced specific concern that the government bureaucracy, with its greater resources and expertise, could practically coerce other litigants to comply with its regulatory or litigation position. 158 The BAJA provides, "It is the purpose of this title -(1) to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action .... "1 59 The Supreme Court has summarized the statute's deterrent rationale as follows:
"For many citizens, the costs of securing vindication of their rights and the inability to recover attorneys fees preclude resort to the adjudicatory process. . . . When the cost of contesting a Government order, for example, exceeds the amount at stake, a party has no realistic choice and no effective remedy. In these cases, it is more practical to endure an injustice than to contest it." The EAJA was designed to rectify this situation.160
Congress was particularly concerned that small businesspersons were being forced to submit to the government due to the costs of establishing their rights against a bigger, better financed, more experienced adversary.1 61 In congressional debate, Senator Goldwater said: "[T]his glaring inequity of current law is an encouragement to governmental arbitrariness. What hope does a small citizen or business have to challenge all the resources of the mighty Federal Government when even if he wins the administrative or judicial decision, his legal fees virtually leave him in bank- ruptcy?" 162 Senator Baldus echoed this sentiment, stating, "[I]t is a terrifying prospect now of fighting a court case, winning, and yet, going bankrupt." 163 In short, Congress recognized the vulnerability of the small business and provided a remedy for situations in which the taxpayer would be economically defeated even when legally victorious. It is illogical to assume that Congress intended to protect citizens from being driven to the brink of bankruptcy, only to abandon them at the threshold of title 11.1 64 The filing of a bankruptcy petition does not obviate the need for BAJA protection. If the bankruptcy is in the reorganization stage, the debtor in possession has all the same motivations and influences as a prebankruptcy owner involved in a district court case, 165 except that the debtor has fewer resources with which to work. The likelihood of acquiescence to an unreasonable government position is even greater in bankruptcy than in administrative hearings or other civil actions in federal court because the nongovernment party typically has fewer resources than litigants in other civil actions to withstand the economic pressure inherent in litigating against the government. 166 The economic condition of the debtor only magnifies the government's coercive power. The presence, in the bankruptcy courts, of the precise danger that Congress expressly sought 162. 125 CoNG. REc. 21,438 {1979) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 163. 126 CoNG. REc. 28,654 {1980) (statement of Rep. Baldus). 164. Cf. SuUivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 {1988). In Sullivan, the Court awarded EAJA fees to a Social Security claimant for expenses incurred in an administrative proceeding in which the United States was not represented by an attorney, 490 U.S. at 892-93, notwithstanding the fact that the EAJA only allows for an award of fees in administrative hearings when the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise. 5 U.S.C. § 504{b ){l){C) {1988). In support of its holding, the Court reasoned that "we find it difficult to ascribe to Congress an intent to throw the Social Security claimant a lifeline that it knew was a foot short." 490 U.S. at 890. It is equally difficult to ascribe such a congressional intent regarding a bankrupt claimant, especially in light of the concern for small business repeatedly expressed in the congressional debate. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
165. The debtors in possession "bring to the bankruptcy court their old allegiances and antagonisms, as well as their business judgment and experience." JAMES J. WHITE & RAY-MOND T. NIMMER, BANKRUPTCY 64 {2d ed. 1992). This is not to say that the actual prefiling disputes the debtor in possession may have had with the government Will be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Those disputes will likely be postponed by the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 {1988). The debtor in possession faced with a bankruptcy dispute against the federal government is, however, subject to the same pressures that Congress believed were deterring citizens from asserting their legal rights. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984.
166. Although the debtor enjoys some procedural advantages, such as the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. § 362 {1988), that are designed to reduce the economic pressure inherent in bankruptcy, the automatic stay does nothing to reduce the pressure inherent in a violation of the stay, an action to lift the stay, or an objection to the debtor's use of cash collateral by the government. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 {1988). Application of the EAJA would encourage a debtor to litigate these issues, confident that if the government acted without substantial justification, the debtor will not suffer a loss solely by asserting its rights.
to prevent through the BAJA 1 67 emphasizes the need to interpret the BAJA correctly to resolve this situation.
Placing Litigants on Equal Footing
In enacting the BAJA, Congress sought to remove the federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to attorney's fees. 1 68 Before Congress passed the BAJA in 1980, courts could not shift fees against the United States without explicit statutory authority.169 The government was therefore immune to many statutory fee-shifting laws and common law exceptions to the American rule to which its citizens were subject. Congress enacted the BAJA specifically to put the government on equal footing with other litigants already subject to fee-shifting rules.17°
Absent BAJA authority the bankruptcy courts have the power to award fees and costs when appropriate, but not against the federal government. 171 By enacting the BAJA, Congress changed this 171. Without EAJA authority, bankruptcy courts would be prevented from shifting fees and costs against the federal government in situations in which they could shift fees and costs against a private litigant. These limitations arise in at least four contexts. First, bankruptcy rule 7054 allows courts to shift costs to prevailing parties unless prohibited by law. See FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7054{b). The opposite presumption applies to the federal government, as costs may be shifted against the federal government only to the extent permitted by law. The Supreme Court has emphasized that § 106 is not a complete waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 {1992); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 {1989). Waivers of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed," Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1014, and are to be strictly construed. 112 S. Ct. at 1015. The Court has not clarified the specific question of whether a § 362{h) claim for damages resulting from a violation of the automatic stay against the federal government is precluded by sovereign immunity. to the American rule. 173 This reasoning applies as much to the bankruptcy courts as to other federal courts.
The BAJA purpose of eliminating the federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to litigation costs is also consistent with the waiver of sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy code.1 74 When the government acts as a litigant rather than in its sovereign capacity, there is no need to extend sovereign immunity.11s Congress's decision to hold government parties to the same standards as other litigants 176 recognizes that government parties that act without substantial justification, like the Farmers Home Administration in Davis,111 or the IRS, 178 have no special right to immunity based on their status as governmental units. The reasons for removing the federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to attorney fees are therefore as compelling in the bankruptcy court as in other federal courts vested with EAJA jurisdiction.
Deterrence of Unjustified Government Action
Congress enacted the BAJA in part to deter unjustified government action in bringing and litigating lawsuits. 17 9 Including the 173. Id. 174. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 {1988). 175. The Supreme Court has held the EAJA is subject to a narrow interpretation as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520-21 (1991). Of course, the corollary to the general rule concerning waivers of immunity is that a court should not construe a waiver more narrowly than Congress intended it. Ardestani, 112 S. Ct. at 520. As demonstrated earlier, when the EAJA was passed, Congress intended for the bankruptcy courts to exercise EAJA jurisdiction. See supra section II.B.1. Therefore, the rule requiring a narrow construction of the EAJA does not exclude the bankruptcy courts from EAJA jurisdiction.
Additionally 238-41 (1986) . Because the purpose of the rule requiring a narrow construction of waivers of sovereign immunity is to protect public funds and allow for discretion in legitimate government action, and because the EAJA reflects the legislature's judgment regarding the proper balancing of both those factors, the EAJA should not be subject to the rule requiring narrow construction of waivers of sovereign immunity. See Ardestan~ (1985) ("In its methodology, the bankruptcy courts within EAJA jurisdiction serves this purpose. At the time the EAJA was passed, Congress was concerned that government agencies sometimes abused their power.180 By putting these government entities at risk for their opponent's attorney's fees, 18 1 Congress hoped to curb the unreasonable exercise of government authority. This continues to be an important goal in bankruptcy, where excessive litigation often channels the estate's resources to the attorneys, rather than to creditors and the debtor. 182
Testing Government Action
Prior to the enactment of the EAJA, Congress perceived that many government positions went unc;:hallenged due to the high cost of litigating against the government. 183 As a result, the government repeatedly asserted these positions although they were never legitimated through a hearing. 184 Congress was not only concerned about untested government arguments; it also believed that, too (Vol. 92:2248 often, government decisions to litigate went unchallenged. 1 85 Without the threat of challenges by citizens, governmental power was only limited by its own discretion. Congress believed this was an insufficient check on government authority. 18 6 The citizens who do challenge the government and force litigation thereby provide a type of public service, especially when the government's position is unjustified. 187 Granting the bankruptcy courts the ability to shift fees under the BAJA will help test and thereby improve the quality of government positions in bankruptcy cases.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION UNDER THE CURRENT BAJA
Three possible alternatives to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over BAJA petitions exist. First, bankruptcy courts could forward proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning BAJA petitions to the district courts for final judgment. 188 Second, bankruptcy courts could obtain the consent of the parties to exercise BAJA power. 1 8 9 Third, Congress could again amend the BAJA definition of court. 190 This Part argues that none of these options provides a solution preferable to interpreting the BAJA accurately according to its language, history, and purposes. Section III.A argues that forwarding proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the BAJA issue to the district court is inefficient, expensive, and runs counter to the purposes of the BAJA. Section 111.B argues that having the bankruptcy court request the consent of the parties to the courts' exercise of BAJA authority is unworkable in practice.
Section IIl.C argues that simply waiting for Congress again to amend the EAJA definition of court is unfaithful to the statute and confuses the roles of the judiciary and the legislature. This Part concludes that the lack of acceptable substitutes for direct bankruptcy jurisdiction over EAJA applications provides the final indication that Congress likely intended to include bankruptcy courts within the EAJA's jurisdictional grant.·
A. Forwarding Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the District Court for Approval
The Eleventh Circuit in Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Davis) 191 suggested that the bankruptcy courts may forward EAJA petitions to the district court according to the procedure provided by 28 U.S.C. § 157. 192 Under this procedure, bankruptcy courts may forward proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review. The procedure permits the district court, an Article III court unquestionably vested with EAJA jurisdiction, to issue the final order regarding the fee application. 193 This suggestion mirrors the system currently used when "noncore" 1 9 4 disputes arise before the bankruptcy (1988) . In a "noncore" proceeding, absent consent of the parties to bankruptcy court adjudication, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988), the bankruptcy court hears the case, but does not decide it The bankruptcy court submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review of any finding to which one of the parties objects. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988). The district court then enters final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988) .
The Davis court refers to the EAJA application as a noncore proceeding, 899 F.2d at 1140-41. This holding coincides with the Davis court's finding that bankruptcy courts may not award EAJA fees, but the conclusion that EAJA applications are not core proceedings is not perfectly obvious. At least two courts have held that a request for fees under the EAJA's sister statute, 26 U.S.C. § Cir. 1985 ) (remanding to bankruptcy court for a determination of the appropriateness of an EAJA award). Given the language of28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0), which designates "other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate" as core matters, and the fact that EAJA petitions surely affect asset liquidation, the reasoning of the Kreidle court seems to give the correct result. Another way to consider the problem is to recognize that the distinction between core and noncore is Congress's attempt to rectify the jurisdiction problem exposed in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982 Such a procedure presents two difficulties. First, it requires an adjudication by a court that is one step removed from the parties and the administration of the case. A court ruling on an BAJA application must exercise considerable judgment. Courts may not shift fees if the position of the United States was "substantially justified"196 or if "special circumstances make an award unjust." 1 97 A district court may not be able to perform an effective de novo review without firsthand information. The bankruptcy court, on the other hand, is intimately familiar with the totality of the case, including the legal positions and conduct of the parties. The bankruptcy court is therefore the best judicial body to determine whether an award is warranted. As a result, the de novo review performed by the district court may amount to little more than a rubber stamp of the bankruptcy court's proposed findings. 198 In such an instance, the procedure serves no purpose but to increase the legal costs. This result conflicts with one of the purposes of the EAJA -to reduce the deterrent effect of legal fees on the average citizen's willingness to litigate against the federal government. 199 Second, requiring the district court to repeat the work of the bankrµptcy court misuses judicial resources. Even if the district court engages in a pro forma review of the bankruptcy court's findings, the procedure under section 157 of the bankruptcy code consumes judicial resources. 200 The federal district courts are already overburdened 201 and should not be saddled with additional respon-sibilities better handled by the bankruptcy courts. Furthermore, because of the busy schedules of the district courts, it is conceivable that a request from a bankruptcy court for a de novo review could linger indefinitely, particularly because under the mandate of the Speedy Trial Act civil suits are relegated to second priority.2 02 In addition, district courts rarely want to hear bankruptcy disputes. 203 The resulting delay and aggravation to the courts caused by forwarding proposed findings to the district courts 204 ill serves the purposes of the EAJA 2 os and the bankruptcy system.20 6 It is true that the bankruptcy system must tolerate the additional expenses of this noncore adjudication process when the bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to accommodate the mandate of Marathon that "the power to adjudicate 'private rights' must be vested in an Art[icle] III court." 207 But no such constitutional requirement exists with respect to EAJA motions. 208 Because Congress gave the bankruptcy courts EAJA authority in 1980, 20 9 there is no reason to endure the additional expense of forwarding EAJA petitions to the district courts.
B. Obtaining the Consent of the Parties to Adjudication by the Bankruptcy Court
Relying on the consent of the parties to ba:p.kruptcy court jurisdiction over EAJA petitions is an unworkable solution because a government party, in furtherance of its self-interest, will likely never give its consent. 210 The EAJA requires the losing federal agency to pay the litigation expenses of a prevailing nongovemment party unless the government can prove that its position was [Vol. 92:2248 substantially justified. 211 Therefore, a government party that consents to bankruptcy court jurisdiction incurs additional risk for the litigation costs of the opposing party, but receives no reward. With nothing to gain, the government party would be foolish to consent to the exercise of EAJA jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court. 2 1 2 This alternative is untenable because it places the power to consent to bankruptcy court authority with a party that will only harm itself by exercising such authority.
C. Amending the EAJA Definition of Court
A third alternative is a congressional amendment to the EAJA to include the bankruptcy courts within the BAJA definition of court. Anthony Sabino argues that Congress should again amend the EAJA to include the bankruptcy court within its definition of court, 213 following the amendments that included the Claims Court and the Court of Veterans Appeals. 214 He reasons that "Congress created the EAJA, thus, it is best suited to modify the BAJA to address new dynamics in its application." 2 1s
Although amending the EAJA's definition of court to include the bankruptcy court would obviously solve the problem of the EAJA's jurisdictional scope with respect to the bankruptcy courts, the prospect of amendment does not alleviate the courts' responsibility to interpret the law as it is written. Congress cannot be expected to address every new dynamic in the application of each law it has enacted. 216 Congress' failure to respond to the circuit split on the issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the BAJA may simply be the result of a need to focus on more pressing matters.
Courts must interpret the EAJA currently before them, and as this Note has demonstrated, the text, history, and purposes of the statute all indicate that bankruptcy courts already have the authority to shift fees against the federal government.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the EAJA to increase access to the court system by encouraging litigants to challenge unreasonable government positions. The bankruptcy courts are not immune to unreasonable government positions. The coercive nature of an adversary with the vast resources of the United States weighs heavily on a party trying to salvage its estate or contract rights in the bankruptcy court. The chance to assert one's rights without the additional expense of litigation encourages parties to assert their rights. Bankruptcy court authority over EAJA petitions serves the purposes of the EAJA.
In addition, the language of the statute that grants authority to "any court" having subject-matter jurisdiction firmly supports bankruptcy court authority over the BAJA. The confounding history of the EAJA, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the transition period, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, and the subsequent amendments to the EAJA's definition of "court" create considerable ambiguity, particularly with respect to the EAJA's legislative history. A careful examination of each event within its historical context, however, leads to the single conclusion that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to have EAJA power. By examining the history of the EAJA, this Note has reconciled the seeming direct contradiction between the language of the EAJA and its legislative history. The reconciliation points to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over EAJA petitions.
It is true that Congress has remained silent on the issue, despite a controversy in the courts. This silence, however, does not indicate congressional opposition to bankruptcy court authority. In fact, Congress has not subsequently refuted its original extension of EAJA power to the bankruptcy courts. The arguments that rely on Congress's silence to exclude the bankruptcy courts from EAJA authority simply misinterpret Congress's actions since the EAJA's enactment.
Finally, alternative ways for bankruptcy litigants to recover their fees if they prevail against the government are implausible due to their expense and impracticability. The very existence of these proposals suggests that even those who believe the EAJA does not grant the bankruptcy courts the ability to shift fees believe that litigants should be able to recover their fees in the bankruptcy courts. Instead of looking elsewhere, however, courts need only rely upon
